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Constitutional Law-Flag Desecration
as Symbolic Speech
In 1966, as a protest against the Viet Nam war, William Hodsdon improperly displayed an American flag. Following an unsuccessful attempt in federal court to enjoin this conduct,' Hodsdon was
indicted under the Delaware flag desecration statute.' Hodsdon
responded with a request in federal district court for declaratory and
injunctive relief on first amendment grounds. Held, Injunctive relief
denied; declaratory relief granted. The Delaware statute was found
overbroad and declared unconstitutional. Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310
F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970).
In Hodsdon the court maintained that, although the law must be
invalidated in its entirety because its broad language might deter
protected expression, some of the statute's objectives could be re-

alized.3 In support of this position the court referred to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Street v. New York, 4
in which the four dissenting Justices implied that flag desecration
statutes could prohibit flag burning.5 However, Hodsdon stated that
even though the government's purpose in proscribing flag desecration
was legitimate, such purpose could not be acheived by language which
stifled peaceful nonverbal communication. 6 Hodsdon cited the Su' In the Delaware federal district court, an action was brought to enjoin
Hodsdon from displaying the American flag in a manner contrary to
the flag etiquette provisions of Display and Use of Flag by Civilians; Position and Manner of Display, 36 U.S.C. §175(c) (1953). Hodsdon had displayed a United Nations flag on the right side of his home and a United
States flag in a position of inferiority on the left side. In addition, the
American flag had been flown at half mast. The district court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction. Delaware ex rel. Trader v. Hodsdon, 265 F.
Supp. 308 (D. Del. 1967).
2 11 Del. C. § 532 (1953). "Whoever publicly mutilates, defaces, defiles,
defies, tramples upon or casts contempt either by word or act, upon
[the American flag] . . ." is guilty of a misdemeanor. This section has been
amended to read "No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy,
trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield." 11 Del. C. § 533, as amended, (Supp. 1970).
The nearly identical section of the West Virginia Code is found in W. Va.
CODE ch. 61, art. 1, § 8 (Michie 1966), which reads: "Any person who
. . . shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile or defy, trample upon or cast contempt, either by words or acts, upon any (American flag) . . . shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... "
3 310 F. Supp. 528, 532 (D. Del. 1970).
4394 U.S. 576 (1969).
5
- d at 605, 610, 615.
6310

F. Supp. 528, 532 (D. Del. 1970).
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preme Court decisions of Stromberg v. California7 and Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District8 for the rule that in
some circumstances peaceful nonverbal communication is recognized
as protected expression.
The Government in Hodsdon contended that the case was controlled by the rationale of United States v. O'Brien,9 a draft card
burning case, in which the Supreme Court held the government interest in the efficient administration of the selective service system
justified a statute prohibiting the deliberate burning of cards. In
O'Brien the Supreme Court formulated a four-step test for the incidental limitation of nonverbal communication in the furtherance of
a governmental interest.'" In applying this test, Hodsdon found the
only governmental interest promoted by the Delaware statute was an
interest in proscribing expression."
Hodsdon also declared the statute unconstitutional because it
made no attempt to limit the circumstances in which gestures of nonadherence to the political ideas symbolized by the flag were prohibited. 2 Hodsdon relied on the Supreme Court case of West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette"3 in asserting that the state
7 283 U.S. 359 (1931). In Stromberg, the petitioner was a leader at a
youth camp where the children pledged daily allegiance to the Soviet
flag. Petitioner was convicted of violating a California statute which made it
a crime to fly "any flag . . . as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to
organized government. . . ." Id. at 360. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction on the ground that a state could not proscribe symbolic acts
for no reason other than to suppress expression.
8393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker respondent had promulgated a school
regulation which prohibited students from wearing black armbands as a
symbol of opposition to the Viet Nam war. In the opinion, Fortas, J. compared the wearing of armbands to "pure speech" which was entitled to comprehensive protection under the first amendment.
9 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court said "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376.
10A government regulation is sufficiently justified if (1) it is within
the constitutional power of government; (2) it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; (3) the interest is unrelated to the suppression of expression; (4) the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 376-77.
"1310 F. Supp. at 533.
12 310 F. Supp. at 535.
13 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Barnette school authorities had tried to
make compulsory a flag salute in the schools. The Court held that the
salute was a form of expression which could not be compelled.
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could not compel a symbolic act of adherence to the American flag.14
The court relied on the Stromberg decision"5 in declaring that the
state could not proscribe symbolic acts merely for the purpose of
suppressing expression. The court concluded the Barnette and
Stromberg rationales protected peaceful symbolic acts rejecting the
political ideas represented by the flag."8
Finally, Hodsdon found the statute unconstitutional because it
lacked safeguards against the impairment of liberty when public order
was not threatened. The court admitted that the state had a legitimate
interest in preserving public order, but stated that a statute which
sought to regulate conduct must be carefully drafted to prevent
abridging freedom of expression.' The court declared the attempt
by the Delaware authorities to apply the flag desecration statute to
Hodsdon's acts clearly demonstrated that it impaired freedom of
expression.
Comparing Hodsdon to other flag desecration cases is difficult
because the Hodsdon case was approached from a different perspective. In Hodsdon the principal question was the permissible scope
of a flag desecration statute. In the other cases, the courts have
emphasized the question of whether the state had a legitimate interest in banning flag desecration. The federal district court in United
States v. Ferguson'" concluded that the government's interest in
protecting national symbols outweighed the individual's interest in
using the flag as an act of nonverbal communication. The court said
the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution gave Congress
the authority to select and maintain a national symbol. This authority
naturally included the right to enact laws to protect the flag from
desecration.' 9 Ferguson further implied the government had a legitimate interest in using the flag to promote a sense of national
loyalty." Hodsdon on the other hand emphasized that the first
amendment guaranteed the right to express attitudes of defiance or
contempt toward the government. 2 '
14310 F. Supp. at 535. The attorney general in an advisory opinion
had indicated the Delaware flag desecration statute could be used to ban
gestures of nonadherence to political ideas represented by the American flag
i.e., the "clenched fist" or the "black power" salute at athletic events.
i'Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
16 310 F. Supp. at 535.
171d. at 535.
18 302 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (Defendants burned a flag at a
demonstration).
191d. at 1114.
20
Id.
21 310 F. Supp. at 535-36.
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In Hoffman v. United States2 the federal district court stated
the government had an interest in protecting the flag from acts of
desecration and disgrace.23 In Halter v. Nebraska" the Supreme

Court said "insults to a flag have been the cause of war, and indignities put upon it, in the presence of those who revere it, have often

been resented and sometimes punished on the spot."2

Other cases

have simply stated that in the exercise of its police power the state
could proscribe conduct which threatened the public order.2"
Similar to the interest in maintaining public order is the interest
in regulating the use of chattels for the protection of the public wellbeing. For example, Justice Fortas in his Street v. New York2"
dissent, stated if it were permissible for the state to prohibit the
burning of chattels on a sidewalk, then a different rule should not
apply to flag burning.2" Justice Fortas also stated that the flag was
a special kind of personalty and its use was traditionally subject to
special regulations.29 The Government's interest in protecting the
flag as a special chattel presumably gave it the power to prohibit
flag burning, though the burning was done to convey an idea.
The court in Hodsdon delayed its decision so that it would have
the guidance of the Street decision. In Street the petitioner was convicted of flag desecration for burning an American flag in protest of
22

256 A.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Abbie Hoffman attended a Con-

gressional committee meeting wearing a shirt which resembled an American flag. He was arrested and convicted of desecration of the flag of the
United
His conviction was affirmed.
2 3 States, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1968).
Id. at 569.
24 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
This is one of the earliest flag desecration cases.
It involved a prosecution for violating a statute which made it a crime to
use the American flag in advertisement. Most states, including West Virginia, have a statute similar to the one under which Halter was convicted.
See W. VA. CODE Ch. 61, art. 1, § 8 (Michie 1966).
25 205 U.S. at 41.
26
E.g., People v. Cowgill, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (App. Dep't Super. Ct., Los
Angeles County 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371 (Defendant cut up an American flag, sewed it into his
vest, and wore it on the street.); People v. Street. 20 N.Y.2d 231, 282
N.Y.S.2d 491, 229 N.E.2d 187 (1967), rev'd on other grounds sub nora.
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (Defendant burned a flag as a
protest); People v. Radich, 53 Misc. 2d 717, 279 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Crim. Ct.
N.Y. City 1967) (Defendant was an artist who had built several "constructions" using the American flag. These objects were displayed in a public
art gallery. One of the "constructions" was a crucifix topped by an erect
penis wrapped in a flag. It was intended to symbolize aggressive American involvement in the Viet Nam war).
27 394 U.S. 516, 615 (1969).
28
1d. at 616.
29 394 U.S. at 616-17.
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the shooting of civil rights leader James Meredith."0 As the flag
burned on a streetcorner, Street said, "We don't need no damn
flag. .

.

. If they let that happen to Meredith we don't need an

American flag."'" These acts occurred in the presence of a policeman and a small group of bystanders. At Street's trial the court
admitted testimony concerning his statements while burning the flag.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because of the possibility
that Street might have been convicted for these statements, and such
a conviction would have been an unconstitutional abridgment of his
freedom of speech. Thus, the Supreme Court neatly sidestepped the
question of whether a person could be punished for burning a flag
as an act of protest. 2 Chief Justice Warren criticized the majority
for avoiding this question.33 The Street decision nullified flag desecration statutes which ban verbal desecration; however, it did not
resolve the issue of physical desecration.
The peaceful tone of the defendant's acts in Hodsdon exposed
the overbroadness of the Delaware flag desecration statute. In the
other cases discussed, the inflammatory character of the conduct
allowed those courts to avoid considering the constitutional limits
of flag desecration prohibitions. This variance in conduct probably
accounts for the difference in the Hodsdon result.
Robert R. Skinner

"0 Street was convicted of violating N. Y. Penal Law § 1425(16)(d)
McKinney 1944). This statute is substantially identical to the Delaware
and West Virginia flag desecration statutes.
3 394 U.S. at 579.
3
2 Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp. 528, 533 (D. Del. 1970):
The Supreme Court intimated no opinion in Street as to the constitutionality of efforts to punish acts alone which "Mutilate, deface, defile or defy, trample upon or cast contempt upon" the
flag. Defendants here urge that the "words" portion of the Delaware statute is severable, and that insofar as the "acts" portion is
concerned, Street made no determination of its validity. This
court agrees.

11 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969): Warren, CJ., stated that
the Court had "declined to meet and resolve the basic question presented" in the case. Id. at 595. He further declared that a reading of the
trial record showed that Street was convicted not for his words but for
burning the flag and that Street's words were mentioned only to show that
he burned the flag with an intent to desecrate it. Id. at 596, 599.
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